In The New Republic, Jacob Dallal, former officer in the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit, explains what went wrong in Jenin. The IDF’s approach to journalists was the main problem, according to Dallal:
While it soon became clear that there was no massacre… the impression of a massacre persists, and the association of “Jenin” and “massacre” cannot be fully erased from international consciousness. This teaches us something fundamental about shaping world opinion in a low-intensity conflict: It is, unfortunately, not always the reality–the actual facts–that matter, but rather the perception of the reality; and that perception is formed by the media, and the perception in the media is formed by the initial rendition of the event. An untruth cannot be allowed to linger–it has to be disproved, to a reasonable journalistic standard, immediately. Otherwise you can do all the damage control you want, but the initial impression will never be fully erased.
The IDF has learned this lesson the hard way. Had we sent a single representative of the foreign press into Jenin for half an hour every day of the week during the fighting, I can say with almost full certainty that the claims of a massacre would not have taken root.
