When the Abraham Accords were signed in 2020, the historic normalization agreements between Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain were hailed as a breakthrough for Middle Eastern diplomacy. Sudan and Morocco soon joined the pact, with hopes and expectations that “circle of peace” would expand and transform the region.
Five years later, Israel is locked in a war fought on seven fronts, and the Accords face their toughest test yet. Despite mounting regional pressures, Jonathan Schanzer of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies argues that the Accords have not only survived but continue to offer a roadmap for reshaping the region.
Enduring Ties Under Strain
Schanzer describes the past two years as some of the bleakest in the region’s recent history—but emphasizes that the Accords remain a rare bright spot. The UAE has maintained steady diplomatic and commercial ties with Israel, keeping flights open even during times of crisis. Bahrain, though a smaller player, has upheld its commitments as well.
Morocco has proven more complicated. Although people-to-people connections there have been the strongest of all the Abraham Accords partners, public anger over the war in Gaza has strained relations. Meanwhile, Sudan, which signed onto the Accords in 2020, has since descended into civil war, creating openings for Iranian, Hamas, and al-Qaeda influence to return.
By contrast, the two Arab states that established peace with Israel before the Accords—Jordan and Egypt—have seen ties sour. Both governments have leveled increasingly hostile rhetoric against Israel since October 7, and Egypt has even mobilized militarily to prevent a flood of Gaza refugees into the Sinai. Jordan faces a different challenge: its long and porous border with Israel has become a channel for Iranian-backed smuggling of weapons, fighters, and cash into the West Bank.
Why the Accords Hold
Why haven’t the Accords collapsed under the weight of war, Iranian pressure, and public anger? Schanzer points to the UAE’s distinct vision for the Middle East. Abu Dhabi views itself as a diplomatic vehicle for stability, seeking to move the region away from violence and ideological extremism. The Emiratis are staunch opponents of both the Iranian regime and Islamist movements like Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood.
This pragmatic approach has allowed the UAE and Bahrain to weather the storm. Morocco remains the outlier, navigating internal dissent, but the core architecture of the Accords is holding. At the same time, adversaries such as Iran, Qatar, and Turkey are lobbying hard to break that framework—pressuring Accords countries to cut ties with Israel, recognize a Palestinian state, and isolate Jerusalem diplomatically. According to Schanzer, the pressure campaign is more intense today than at any point since 2020.
Quiet Support and Regional Calculations
One of the most significant, if understated, roles played by the UAE has been humanitarian. Emirati aid deliveries to Gaza—via air drops and food shipments—have been carried out quietly, without political grandstanding or anti-Israel rhetoric. Schanzer stresses the importance of this approach. By mitigating pockets of food insecurity, the Emiratis not only help civilians but also reduce the propaganda value of famine accusations against Israel.
Critics argue such aid risks propping up Hamas, but Schanzer sees it differently: “I see them actually helping the Israelis burnish their image,” he said. By contrast, Jordan has paired aid drops with hostile accusations from senior leaders, a starkly different model.
Still, Schanzer notes that Emirati efforts are not purely altruistic. They are also driven by self-interest: preventing the war from spilling closer to the Gulf. The UAE, like Saudi Arabia, values stability and distance from conflict. Their aid efforts, therefore, are about containing the war as much as assisting Gaza.
The “Day After” and the Role of the Gulf
Talk of a postwar plan for Gaza inevitably circles back to the Gulf states. Israel envisions Emirati or Saudi involvement in reconstruction, citing their wealth, pragmatism, and proven track record of building modern, functioning cities. Yet Schanzer is blunt: no Arab state will step foot into Gaza until Hamas is fully defeated.
Defeat, in this context, means more than military setbacks. Hamas must either surrender or be destroyed as a governing force. Otherwise, any outside actor risks being targeted as a threat. “Nobody wants to get into Gaza right now while you still have an Iran-backed terrorist organization sniping at the IDF and aid workers,” Schanzer explained. For now, day-after plans remain purely theoretical.
Next in Line for Normalization?
When asked which countries might be next to normalize, Schanzer’s answer was clear: Saudi Arabia is the prize. As custodians of Islam’s holiest sites and patrons of Muslim states worldwide, Riyadh’s decision would carry transformative weight. If the Saudis normalize, the ripple effect could extend to Muslim-majority countries in Asia and Africa.
Beyond Saudi Arabia, Schanzer notes some potential movement in Syria, though likely limited to functional security arrangements rather than full diplomatic recognition. Lebanon, surprisingly, could emerge as a candidate if efforts to dismantle Hezbollah succeed. Years of Iranian dominance have left Lebanon shackled, but with Hezbollah weakened and its weapons stockpiles depleted, Schanzer sees a “generational opportunity”—albeit one he views with cautious pessimism.
The Qatar Challenge
The greatest immediate threat to the Accords, Schanzer warns, comes from Qatar. Long a sponsor of Hamas, al-Qaeda, ISIS, and the Taliban, Doha is now leveraging its wealth and influence to undermine normalization. From bribing officials to buying the World Cup, Qatar has proven adept at using money to shape outcomes. Today, its goal is clear: wedge Israel away from the U.S. and from its Arab partners.
Whether Qatar succeeds will determine much about the next chapter of the Accords. For now, Israel and its allies must ride out the storm, defeat Hamas, and look for new opportunities to expand normalization.
Transformation, Not Transaction
Ultimately, Schanzer argues that the Abraham Accords are fundamentally different from Israel’s earlier peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan. Those agreements were transactional, rooted in U.S. aid packages and quid pro quo arrangements. The Accords, by contrast, were transformational, born from a genuine desire to reshape the region’s future.
The UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco did not need American handouts. Their decision was strategic, signaling a vision of a Middle East not bound by endless cycles of violence. Five years on, despite enormous pressures, that vision has not collapsed. Instead, it continues to inspire cautious optimism that the region can move toward a different future.
Five Years Later: Promise Amid Peril
The Abraham Accords have not delivered peace, nor could they. But five years in, they have delivered resilience. Flights still run between Tel Aviv and Dubai. Trade and tourism continue. Bahrain and the UAE remain committed partners. Morocco, while strained, has not broken ties.
Against the backdrop of war, these facts are extraordinary. The Accords were not designed to weather such crises, yet they have endured. If Hamas is defeated and if Saudi Arabia eventually joins, the transformation they set in motion could reshape the Middle East for generations.
As Schanzer puts it, “So far, so good. But let’s hold our breath and try to get past this current crisis.”
